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{ 1 {Abstract
We present a model in which issuers of asset backed securities choose to release coarse
information to enhance the liquidity of their primary market, at the cost of reducing
secondary market liquidity. The degree of transparency is ineciently low if the social
value of secondary market liquidity exceeds its private value. We show that various
types of public intervention { mandatory transparency standards, provision of liquidity
to distressed banks or secondary market price support { have quite dierent welfare
implications. Finally, we extend the model by endogenizing the private and social value
of liquidity and the proportion of sophisticated investors.
{ 2 {1 Introduction
It is widely agreed that the securitization of mortgage loans has played a key role in the
2007-08 subprime lending crisis (Adrian and Shin, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton,
2008; and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2008, among others). In particular, it is common-
place to lay a good part of the blame for the crisis on the poor transparency that ac-
companied the massive issues of asset backed securities (ABS), such as mortgage backed
securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO): see for instance Financial
Stability Forum (2008) and IMF (2008).
Both securities issuers and rating agencies are responsible for the lack of transparency
of the securitization process. The prospectus of MBS only provided summary statistics
about the typical claim in the underlying pool. Even though detailed information on the
underlying mortgage loans was available from data providers, subscription to these data
sets is expensive and considerable skills are required to analyze them. As a result, most
investors ended up relying on ratings, which simply assess the default probability of the
corresponding security (S&P and Fitch) or its expected default loss (Moody's). These
statistics capture only one dimension of default risk, and fail to convey an assessment
of the systematic risk of CDOs, as pointed out by Coval, Jurek and Staord (2009)
and Brennan, Hein and Poon (2009), and of the sensitivity of such systematic risk to
macroeconomic conditions, as noted by Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009). Moreover, in
their models, rating agencies assumed correlations of defaults in CDO portfolios to be
stable over time, rather than dependent on economic activity, house prices and interest
rates.1
The implied information loss is seen by many not only as the source of the pre-crisis
{ 3 {mispricing of ABS but also as the reason for the subsequent market illiquidity: after
June 2007, the market for ABS shut down, because most market participants did not
have enough information to price and trade these securities. This market freeze created
an enormous overhang of illiquid assets on banks' balance sheets, which in turn resulted
in a credit crunch (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
However, the links between securitization, transparency and market liquidity are less
than obvious. If the opaqueness of the securitization process aects the liquidity of
ABS, why should ABS issuers choose opaqueness over transparency? After all, if the
secondary market is expected to be illiquid, the issue price should be lower.2 But the
pre-crisis behavior of issuers and investors alike suggests that they both saw considerable
benets in securitization based on relatively coarse information. The fact that this is
now highlighted as a major ineciency suggests that there is a discrepancy between the
private and the social benets of transparency in securitization. What is the source
of the discrepancy, and when should it be greatest? How do dierent forms of public
intervention compare in dealing with the problem? These questions are crucial in view of
the current plans of reforming nancial regulation in both the United States and Europe.
In this paper, we propose a model of the impact of transparency on the market
for structured debt products that addresses these issues. Issuers may wish to provide
coarse information about such products in order to improve the liquidity of their primary
market. This is because few potential buyers are sophisticated enough to understand the
pricing implications of complex information, such as that required to assess the systematic
risk of ABS. Releasing such information would create a \winner's curse" problem for
unsophisticated investors in the issue market.3
This point does not apply only to ABS: it extends to any security, insofar as it is
{ 4 {complex and therefore dicult to value. For instance, accurate valuation of the equity
issued by a multidivisional rm would require detailed accounting information about
the performance of each division: yet, few investors would be equipped to process such
detailed information, so that disclosing it may put many potential market participants at a
disadvantage. Similarly, rating the bonds of a large nancial institution such as Citigroup
is at least as complex as rating an ABS, since the details of the bank's portfolio are largely
unobservable. Hence, such a rm may prefer to limit disclosure of its division-level data
in order to widen its shareholder base to less sophisticated investors.4 Another example
is that of \block booking", i.e. the practice of selling securities or goods exclusively in
bundles, rather than separately (Kenney and Klein, 1983): asset managers are shown to
lower trading costs by 48% via \blind auctions" of stocks, whereby they auction a set
of trades as a package to potential liquidity providers, without revealing the identities
of the securities in the package to the bidders (Kavajecz and Keim, 2005).5 In general,
when some investors have limited ability to process information, releasing more public
information may increase adverse selection and thus reduce market liquidity. Incidentally,
this highlights that the standard view that transparency enhances liquidity hinges on all
market participants being equally skilled at information processing and asset pricing.
But while opaqueness enhances liquidity in the primary market, it may reduce it, even
drastically, in the secondary market, and cause ABS prices to decline more sharply when
the underlying loans default. This is because the information not disclosed at the issue
stage may still be uncovered by sophisticated investors later on, especially if it enables
them to earn large rents in secondary market trading.6 So limiting transparency at the
issue stage induces more subsequent information acquisition by sophisticated investors
and shifts the adverse selection problem to the secondary market, reducing its liquidity
{ 5 {or even inducing it to become inactive.7 Conversely, disclosing information at the issue
stage eliminates the sophisticated investors' incentive to seek it before secondary market
trading (being a form of \substitute" disclosure in Boot and Thakor's (2001) terminology),
even though it generates adverse selection in the primary market. Thus, in choosing the
degree of transparency, issuers eectively face a trade-o between primary and secondary
market liquidity.
We show that issuers never choose to release detailed information, even though they
anticipate that this may reduce secondary market liquidity. The reason is that under
transparency, adverse selection arises in the primary market, and therefore is invariably
borne by the issuer in the form of a discounted issue price; conversely, under opaqueness
the adverse selection cost arises in the secondary market only insofar as investors are hit
by a liquidity shock, and therefore with probability less than one.
In general, however, the degree of transparency chosen by issuers will fall short of
the socially optimal whenever secondary market liquidity has a social value in excess of
its private one. This will be the case if the illiquidity of the secondary market triggers
a cumulative process of defaults and premature liquidation of assets in the economy,
for instance because of inecient re sales by banks (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008).
In this case, the socially ecient degree of transparency is higher than that chosen by
the issuers of structured bonds, thus creating a rationale for regulation. In practice,
regulation can raise the transparency of the securitization process either by requiring
issuers of structured debt to release more detailed data about underlying loan pools
or rating agencies to provide more sophisticated ratings: for instance, multidimensional
ratings that not only estimate the probability of default, but also the correlation of default
risk with aggregate risk.
{ 6 {We nd that mandatory transparency is likely to be socially ecient when secondary
market liquidity is very valuable and the adverse selection problem in the secondary
market is very severe { indeed so severe that in the absence of transparency the secondary
market would be inactive. In our setting, this occurs only if the variance of the signal
that only sophisticated investors can process is suciently large, that is, for securities
that are suciently exposed to aggregate risk. Instead, mandating transparency would
be inecient for safer securities, since it would damage their primary market liquidity
with no osetting advantage in the secondary market. This result neatly applies to the
ABS market: the crisis saw the freeze of the market for privately issued MBS, which were
uninsured against default risk, while the market for agency MBS, which carried a public
credit guarantee, remained very liquid throughout 2008-09.8 This is in spite of the fact
that agency MBS are extremely opaque when placed via the TBA (\to-be-announced")
market, where MBS sellers specify only a few basic characteristics of the security to be
delivered (Vickery and Wright, 2010). At the normative level, our model suggests that
mandating greater information disclosure would have been warranted for privately issued
MBS, but not for agency MBS, where greater disclosure would likely damage the liquidity
of the TBA market.
We also analyze the eects of two forms of ex-post public liquidity provision: one
targeted to distressed bondholders when the ABS market is inactive, and the other aimed
at supporting the ABS secondary market price. Both policies eliminate the negative
externality arising from secondary market illiquidity, yet they are not equally desirable for
society. Liquidity provision to distressed bondholders is optimal whenever the secondary
market is inactive, provided that the benets (in terms of larger proceeds from the ABS
sale and no liquidity externality) exceed the costs due to distortionary taxes. Price
{ 7 {support to the ABS market by the government is instead warranted under more restrictive
conditions, as it does not increase the ABS issue price (which is socially benecial) and
instead raises sophisticated investors' informational rents, thus prompting them to seek
more information (which entails no social gain or even a social loss).
Finally, we endogenize the private and social value of liquidity, and the proportion
of sophisticated investors. First, we show how the liquidity externality assumed in the
model can arise: in the presence of severe adverse selection in the ABS secondary market,
a liquidity shock may induce investors to engage in re sales of real assets used in pro-
duction, and thereby hurt suppliers of complementary inputs (e.g., workers), inicting a
deadweight cost to society. Second, we endogenize the proportion of sophisticated in-
vestors faced by an issuer, by assuming that these investors can become sophisticated by
undertaking a costly investment before they know the details of the issue. This extension
allows us to study how the fraction of sophisticated investors depends on the parame-
ters of the model: for instance, we show that nancial sophistication is increasing in the
probability of default and in the magnitude of informational rents.
While our adverse selection setting provides a reason why issuers may prefer ratings to
be coarse and uninformative, another explanation for this outcome has been proposed by
cheap talk models of rating agencies, building upon Lizzeri's (1999) model of certication
intermediaries: Doherty, Kartasheva and Phillips (2009) and Goel and Thakor (2010)
show that rating agencies themselves have an incentive to produce coarse ratings, by
pooling together several types of borrowers within the same rating class in order to
increase the total rating fees that they can charge. Like ours, these models imply that
ratings will be coarse but not inated. In this respect, they dier from recent papers
where ratings are inated because issuers can engage in \rating shopping" (Skreta and
{ 8 {Veldkamp, 2009, and Spatt, Sangiorgi and Sokobin, 2009), and possibly collude with
rating agencies (Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 2009). In contrast, in our setting rating
agencies report information faithfully: in the opaque regime, they simply do not disclose
security characteristics that many investors would be unable to price.9 In practice, both
the coarseness of ratings and their ination induced by rating shopping and collusion
are likely to have played a role in the crisis, and indeed may have amplied each other's
eects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the structure of the model.
Section 3 solves for the equilibrium secondary market prices, while Section 4 characterizes
the issuer's choice between opaqueness and transparency. In Section 5 we determine the
cases in which the socially ecient level of transparency may be higher than the privately
optimal level, and consider various forms of public intervention, some ex-ante such as
mandatory transparency, and other ex-post, such as liquidity provision in the secondary
market for ABS. Section 6 presents two extensions that endogenize magnitudes taken as
exogenous parameters in the baseline model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
An issuer owns a continuum of measure 1 of nancial claims, such as mortgage loans or
corporate bonds, and wants to sell them because the proceeds can be invested elsewhere
at a high enough net rate of return r. For brevity, we shall refer to these nancial claims
simply as \loans".
There are three future states of nature: a good state (G), which occurs with probabil-
ity p, and two bad states (B1 and B2), occurring with probability (1   p)=2 each.10 The
{ 9 {good state corresponds to an economic expansion, while of two bad states, B1 corresponds
to a mild slowdown and B2 to a sharp contraction of aggregate consumption. Therefore,
the marginal utility of future consumption is highest in state B2, intermediate in state B1
and lowest in state G, that is, qB2 > qB1 > qG, where qs denotes the stochastic discount
factor of state-s consumption. These stochastic discount factors are common knowledge.
For simplicity, the risk-free interest rate is set at zero, that is, the price of a certain unit
of future consumption is one: pqG + [(1   p)=2](qB1 + qB2) = 1.
The issuer's pool is formed by two types of loans, 1 and 2, in proportions  and
1    respectively. As shown in Table 1, both type-1 and type-2 loans pay 1 unit of
consumption in state G, but have dierent payos in bad states: type-1 loans yield x < 1
units of consumption in state B1 and 0 in state B2, while the opposite is true of type-2
loans. Therefore, type-1 loans are more sensitive to aggregate risk than type-2 loans, and
accordingly less valuable by an amount equal to the dierence between their state prices,
[(1   p)=2](qB2   qB1)x > 0.11
Table 1. Loan Payos
State Probability
Payo
of type-1
claim
Payo
of type-2
claim
State
price
Payo
of claim
pool
G p 1 1 pqG 1
B1 (1   p)=2 x 0
1 p
2 qB1 x
B2 (1   p)=2 0 x
1 p
2 qB2 (1   )x
2.1 Securitization
We assume that the issuer must sell these claims as a portfolio because selling them one-
by-one would be prohibitively costly.12 The portfolio's payo is 1 in state G when both
loan types do well, x in state B1 and (1   )x in state B2. The portfolio is sold as an
{ 10 {ABS, promising to repay a face value F = 1, which will be shown to be the face value
that issuers will choose in equilibrium. So the ABS's payo equals its face value F only
in the good state, while default occurs in the two bad states.
The actual composition  of the ABS in any period is random. It can take two values
with equal probability: a low value L =     or a high value H =  + . Therefore,
the ABS composition  has mean  and variance 2, where  6 min(;1   ) ensures
that  2 [0;1]. Instead of , below it will often be convenient to use the deviations from
its mean e      , which equal   or  with equal probability.
The randomness of the portfolio composition adds a layer of complexity to the ABS
payo structure relative to that of its underlying claims. For the ABS, there are six
payo-relevant states rather than three, because  creates uncertainty about the ABS's
exposure to systematic risk, as illustrated in Table 2. Specically, since a high realization
of  lowers the payo in the worst state (B2) while raising it in the intermediate state (B1),
it corresponds to a higher systematic risk. Therefore,  measures the ABS systematic
risk in each contingency.
Table 2. ABS Payos
State Probability ABS payo State price
1H: G;  = H
p
2 1
p
2qG
2H: B1;  = H
1 p
4 Hx =
 
 + 

x
1 p
4 qB1
3H: B2;  = H
1 p
4 (1   H)x =
 
1      

x
1 p
4 qB2
1L: G;  = L
p
2 1
p
2qG
2L: B1;  = L
1 p
4 Lx =
 
   

x
1 p
4 qB1
3L: B2;  = L
1 p
4 (1   L)x =
 
1    + 

x
1 p
4 qB2
The correct price of the ABS will depend on its actual composition, that is, on the
realized value of :
V () = pqG +
1   p
2
x[qB1 + (1   )qB2]: (1)
{ 11 {This expression takes two dierent values depending on the realized value of , i.e. the
ABS's actual exposure to systematic risk. We assume that the realization of  2 (L;H)
is not observed, but can be estimated from an information set  that the issuer has and
can reveal to investors.
The key assumption of the model is that, if the information  is publicly disclosed,
not all investors are able to use it to estimate the realization of : only a fraction  of
investors (say, hedge funds) are sophisticated enough as to do so, and thus can price the
ABS according to (1). The remaining 1    investors are not skilled enough to learn ,
even if they can condition on information . As a result, each pair of states indexed
by H and L in Table 2 (for instance, states 1H and 1L) are indistinguishable to them.
Therefore, their best estimate of the value of the ABS is obtained by setting  at its
average  in the pricing formula (1), so that on average they do not make mistakes in
pricing the ABS. However, they are rational enough to realize that they incur in pricing
errors, are aware of their variance, and therefore are willing to buy the ABS only at a
discount large enough to oset their expected losses to sophisticated investors.
Interestingly, unsophisticated investors are at a disadvantage compared to sophisti-
cated ones only in pricing the ABS, but not the individual loans of which the ABS is
composed, since to value these only the payos in the three states G, B1 and B2 (and their
prices) are relevant. It is the complexity of the ABS that determines their disadvantage
in security pricing.
2.2 Transparency Regimes
The issuer knows the probability of repayment p, the loss in each default state (x or 1),
the distribution of  and the information set  required to infer the realized value of .
{ 12 {He can choose between two regimes: a \transparent" regime where the issuer discloses
all his information, and an \opaque" regime where he withholds the information . In
both cases he credibly certies the information via a rating agency (for simplicity, at a
negligible cost). The agency is assumed to be trustworthy, due to penalties or reputational
costs for misreporting. Note that the information available in the opaque regime is akin
to that reected in real-world ratings, where S&P and Fitch estimate the probability
of default 1   p and Moody's assesses the expected loss from default (1   p)(1   x=2).
We assume both the issuer and the rating agency to be unsophisticated, and therefore
unable to infer the realized value of  from , so that they do not have an informational
advantage over investors.13
In the opaque scenario, where  is not disclosed, investors are on a level playing eld:
they all ignore the true ABS payos x and (1 )x in the two default states B1 and B2,
so that both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors must rely on the average loan
composition  to value the ABS. For all of them, its risk-adjusted Present Discounted
Value (PDV) is
VO = pqG +
1   p
2
x

qB1 + (1   )qB2

= pqG +
1   p
2
xqB; (2)
where the subscript O stands for \opaque" and qB 

qB1 + (1   )qB2

is the average
discount factor of the ABS in each of the two default states. So in this regime the superior
pricing ability of sophisticated investors (i.e., their ability to price separately consumption
in states B1 and B2) is irrelevant.
Instead, in the transparent scenario,  is disclosed, so that sophisticated investors can
infer the actual risk exposure  of the loan pool. As a result, they correctly estimate the
{ 13 {PDV of the ABS according to expression (1):
VT = V () = VO  
1   p
2
xe (qB2   qB1): (3)
This expression shows that with transparency the correct valuation of the ABS, VT, is
equal to the opaque-regime valuation VO minus a term proportional to e , i.e. the deviation
of the ABS aggregate risk sensitivity  from its average. This term captures the superior
risk-pricing ability of sophisticated investors.
In contrast, unsophisticated investors are unable to use the information about the
actual loan pool quality , and therefore will end up estimating the PDV of the ABS as
expression (2). Therefore, they will misprice the ABS: if the sensitivity of the ABS to
aggregate risk is high (e  = ), they will overestimate its PDV by
(1   p)
x
2
(qB2   qB1); (4)
and in the opposite case (e  =  ), they will underestimate it by the same amount.
As they incur into either pricing error with equal probability, this expression measures
their average mispricing, which is increasing in the variability of the ABS risk sensitivity,
, and in the dierence between the two state prices ((1   p)=2)(qB2   qB1). By the
same token, expression (4) also measures the informational advantage of sophisticated
investors, or more precisely their expected informational rent (1   p)R: as we shall see,
whenever they know , sophisticated investors can extract a rent
R 
x
2
(qB2   qB1) (5)
in default states, i.e. with probability 1   p. However, unsophisticated investors are
fully rational: they realize to be at an informational disadvantage when bidding in the
initial ABS sale under transparency (or when trading in the secondary market under
opaqueness, if some sophisticated investors have become informed later on).
{ 14 {Sophisticated investors are assumed to lack the wherewithal to buy the entire ABS
issue. Since the price they would oer for the entire issue is the expected ABS payo
conditional on the realized , the relevant condition is that their total wealth AS <
VT(L).14 In contrast, unsophisticated investors are suciently wealthy to absorb the
entire issue: their wealth AU > VO, since their oer price for the entire ABS issue is the
unconditional expectation of its payo.15 As in Rock (1986), these assumptions imply
that for the issue to succeed, the price of the ABS must be such as to induce participation
by the unsophisticated investors.
2.3 Time Line
The time line is shown in Figure 1. At the initial stage 0, the composition of the pool
() is determined, and the issuer learns information  about it.
At stage 1, the issuer chooses either transparency or opaqueness, reveals the corre-
sponding information , and sells the ABS on the primary market at price P1 via a
uniform price auction to a set of investors of mass 1.16 If the issuer sets a price that
cannot attract a sucient number of investors to sell the entire issue, the ABS sale fails
and the issuer earns no revenue.
At stage 2, people learn whether the ABS is in default or not. At the same time,
a fraction  of the initial pool of investors is hit by a liquidity shock and must decide
whether to sell their stake in the secondary market or else to liquidate other assets at a
re-sale discount . (Alternatively,  may be seen as the investors' private cost of failing
to meet obligations to their lenders or the penalty for recalling loans or withdrawing lines
of credit.) Liquidity risk is uncorrelated with CDO payos.
If default is announced, the sophisticated investors not hit by the liquidity shock may
{ 15 {try to acquire costly information to learn the realization of , unless of course  was
already disclosed at stage 1. Their probability  of discovering  is increasing in the
resources spent on information acquisition: they learn it with probability  by paying a
cost C. To ensure equilibrium existence, we assume that (i) before acquiring information
about , sophisticated investors observe if liquidity traders have sold other assets or not,17
and (ii) there is a zero-measure set of sophisticated investors who always become informed
at no cost.18
At stage 3, secondary market trading occurs. Competitive market makers set bid and
ask quotes for the ABS so as to make zero prots, and investors who have chosen to trade
place orders with them. Market makers are sophisticated, in that they are able to draw
the pricing implications of the information , if this is publicly disclosed. Moreover, they
have sucient market-making capital as to absorb the combined sales of liquidity and
informed traders. However, they cannot become informed themselves.19
At stage 4, the payos of the underlying portfolios and of the ABS are realized.
This sequence of moves assumes that under opaqueness sophisticated investors wait
for the secondary market trading to invest in information collection, rather than seeking
it before the initial sale of the ABS. The rationale for such an assumption is that ABS
risk is concentrated in default states, so that it pays to seek costly information about 
only once default is known to be impending. Indeed, for sophisticated investors the NPV
from collecting information at stage 2, (1   p)
 
R
2   C

, exceeds that of collecting it at
stage 1, (1   p) R
2   C, where R is dened by (5): in the former case they incur the cost
C only once default is known to occur, rather than always as in the latter.
{ 16 {2.4 Private and Social Value of Liquidity
As we have seen, the investors who may seek liquidity on the secondary market are
\discretionary liquidity traders": their demand for liquidity is not completely inelastic,
because they can turn to an alternative source of liquidity at a private cost . If the
hypothetical discount at which the ABS would trade were to exceed , these investors
will refrain from liquidating their ABS. In this case, as explained above, they may resort
to re sales of other assets; or default on debt and incur the implied reputational and
judicial costs; or forgo other investments, for instance by recalling loans to others.
However, each of these alternatives may entail costs for third parties too. For in-
stance, the illiquidity of the market for structured debt is more costly for society at large
than for individual investors whenever it triggers a cumulative process of defaults and/or
liquidation of assets in the economy, for instance due to \re sale externalities" or to
the knock-on eect arising from banks' interlocking debt and credit positions. Fire-sale
externalities can arise if holders of structured debt securities, being unable to sell them,
cut back on their lending or liquidate other assets, thereby triggering drops in the value
of other institutions holding them, as in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) and Wagner
(2010). Alternatively, the illiquidity of the market for structured debt securities may
force their holders to default on their debts, damaging institutions exposed to them, and
thus triggering a chain reaction of defaults, as in Allen and Gale (2000) or Freixas, Parigi
and Rochet (2000).
Insofar as secondary market liquidity spares these additional costs to society, its social
value exceeds its private value. For simplicity, we model the additional value of liquidity
to third parties as , where   0 measures the negative externality of secondary market
{ 17 {illiquidity. Thus the total social value of liquidity is (1+), and the limiting case  = 0
captures a situation where market liquidity generates no externalities.
3 Secondary Market Equilibrium
In this setting, what degree of transparency will issuers choose? In this section we solve
for the symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game. By backward induction,
we start determining the secondary market equilibrium price at stage 3, conditional on
either repayment or default: we rst determine the market price and the sophisticated
investors' information gathering decision depending on whether or not liquidity traders
sell their ABS, both under transparency and under opaqueness. Then we turn to liquidity
traders' optimal trading decisions at stage 2 in both regimes.
3.1 Secondary Market Price
In the good state G, the ABS is known to repay its face value 1, and therefore its
secondary market price at time 3 is simply P G
3 = qG. The market is perfectly liquid: if
hit by liquidity shocks, investors can sell the ABS at price P G
3 , and obviously collecting
information about  would be futile.
The interesting states, instead, are those where the ABS is expected to be in default
(states B1 or B2), since only in this case the secondary market may be illiquid, as we shall
see below. Therefore, all our subsequent analysis focuses on the subgame where default
occurs at stage 3. In this subgame, to determine the level of the ABS price P B
3 we must
consider three cases, depending on the information made available to investors at stage
1 and on the sophisticated investors' decision to collect information.
In the transparent regime, investors and market makers learn the realization of .
{ 18 {Since market makers are sophisticated, they interpret the information  provided to
the market and impound the relevant state prices in their secondary market quotes. The
ABS's price at stage 3 is simply the expected value of the underlying portfolio conditional
on default, which can be computed as the sum of the payos in B1 and B2 shown in Table
1, each of which occurs with probability 1=2 conditional on default:
P
B
3;T =
x
2
[qB1 + (1   )qB2]; (6)
where the subscript T indicates that this price refers to the transparent regime. In this
case, the secondary market is perfectly liquid, as prices are fully revealing: liquidity
traders face no transaction costs. In this case the market price is a random variable,
whose value depends on the realization of  (or equivalently of e ) and on average is equal
to:
E(P
B
3;T) =
x
2
qB; (7)
which is the unconditional ABS recovery value in the default states B1 and B2. So the
secondary market price in the transparent regime can be rewritten as the sum of the
expected ABS recovery value and a zero-mean innovation:
P
B
3;T =
x
2
qB   e 
x
2
(qB2   qB1): (8)
In the opaque regime, the secondary ABS market is characterized by asymmetric
information: for the sophisticated investors who have discovered the true value of , the
value of ABS is given by expression (8), while for all other investors the ABS value is
given by expression (7). In the default states, the market maker will set the bid price
P B
3;O so as to recover from the uninformed investors what he loses to the informed, as in
Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The choice of this price by the market maker will dier
depending on whether liquidity traders choose to sell the ABS or an alternative asset.
{ 19 {Consider rst the subgame where liquidity traders sell the ABS. Then, in the ABS
market there will be a fraction  of liquidity sellers. A fraction  of the remaining 1 
investors will be informed, and will sell if the bid price is above their estimate of the ABS
value. This occurs if  equals H, or equivalently e  = , i.e. with probability 1=2. To
avoid dissipating their informational rents, informed traders will camouage as liquidity
traders, placing orders of the same size. Hence, the frequency of an investor submitting a
sell order is +(1 )=2. The market maker gains (x=2)qB  P B
3;O when he buys from
an uninformed investor, and loses P B
3;O  (x=2)[qB   (qB2   qB1)] when he buys from an
informed one. Hence, his zero-prot condition is

x
2
qB   P
B
3;O

= (1   )

2
h
P
B
3;O  
x
2
qB +  (qB2   qB1)
i
; (9)
and the implied equilibrium bid price is
P
B
3;O =
x
2
qB  
(1   )
2 + (1   )
x
2
(qB2   qB1)
=
x
2
qB  
(1   )
2 + (1   )
R; (10)
where R is the rent that an informed trader extracts from an uninformed one (conditional
on these both trading), from expression (5). The informed traders' rent R is weighted by
the probability of a sell order being placed by an informed trader, (1   )=[2 + (1  
)]. This expected rent translates into a discount sustained by liquidity traders in the
secondary market: if hit by a liquidity shock, they must sell the ABS at a discount o
the unconditional expectation of its nal payo.
Consider next what happens if liquidity traders decide to sell the alternative asset and
keep the ABS. Then, market makers will rationally anticipate that any incoming order
must originate from an informed investor (recall that, by assumption, there are always
sophisticated investors who acquire information about  at zero cost). Formally, in this
{ 20 {case the market makers' belief is that their probability of trading with an uninformed
investor equals zero. Since informed investors sell only if  equals H, the break-even bid
price set by market makers is
P
B
3;O =
x
2
qB  
x
2
(qB2   qB1) =
x
2
qB   R; (11)
which is the lowest possible price at which any trade can occur and can be obtained by
setting  = 0 in (10). At this price, informed investors are indierent between selling
and not selling.
3.2 Decision to Acquire Information
In the transparent regime, sophisticated investors do not need to spend resources to
acquire information, since  is public knowledge and therefore is impounded in market
makers' quotes. In contrast, in the opaque regime the sophisticated investors who are not
hit by a liquidity shock at stage 2 may want to learn the realization of . Their willingness
to acquire this information depends on whether liquidity traders are also selling the ABS
or not (which they know because of the assumed sequence of moves). If liquidity traders
are not in the ABS market, there are no rents from informed trading and therefore no gain
from acquiring information. If instead liquidity traders are in the ABS market, the gain
from learning  equals the market makers' expected trading loss as determined above:
P
B
3;O  
x
2
[qB    (qB2   qB1)] =
2
2 + (1   )
R; (12)
where in the second step the gain is evaluated at the equilibrium price in (10). This gain
accrues to informed investors with probability 1=2, since only when  = H they make a
prot by selling the ABS.20 Hence, the expected prot from gathering information for a
{ 21 {sophisticated investor i is:
i
2
2
2 + (1   )
R   Ci (13)
where each sophisticated investor i chooses how much to invest in information taking the
benet of information ( 2
2+(1 )R) as given. From the rst-order condition


i =
8
> <
> :
0 if 
2+(1 )R < C;
i 2 [0;1] if 
2+(1 )R = C;
1 if 
2+(1 )R > C:
(14)
In a symmetric equilibrium, 
i =  for all i. Hence, the equilibrium probability of
becoming informed will be

 =
8
> <
> :
0 if R < 2C;

(1 )
 
R
C   2

if R 2

2C;2C + 1 
 C

;
1 if R > 2C + 1 
 C:
(15)
Therefore, sophisticated investors acquire information (that is,  > 0) only if infor-
mational rents are suciently high relative to the corresponding costs (R > 2C). For
intermediate values of R, in equilibrium sophisticated investors choose their probability
 of becoming informed so as to earn zero net prots from information. If R is so high
as to make them always willing to become informed in equilibrium (that is,  = 1),
sophisticated investors will be at a corner solution where they expect to earn a net prot
from information, 
2+(1 )R   C > 0.
3.3 Liquidity Traders' Participation Decision
In the transparent regime, liquidity traders always sell the ABS, since the realization of
 is public knowledge and therefore the ABS market is perfectly liquid. In the opaque
regime, the choice of each liquidity trader depends on his expectation of the ABS bid price
and of the behavior of sophisticated investors and of other liquidity traders. Intuitively,
if an individual liquidity trader envisages sophisticated investors to search information
{ 22 {with high intensity , they will expect the ABS market to be illiquid, and therefore will
be less inclined to participate to it. His participation decision will also be aected by
the choice of other liquidity traders, since the more of them choose to participate, the
more liquid the ABS market: in other words, the ABS market features a participation
externality.
Since we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria, there are two candidate equi-
libria in the liquidity traders' participation subgame: (A) one in which all liquidity traders
sell the alternative asset, sophisticated investors do not seek information, and the market
makers set the bid price (11); (B) another candidate equilibrium in which all liquidity
traders sell the ABS, sophisticated investors search for information with intensity  from
expression (15), and market makers set the bid price (10). In case (A), the ABS market
is virtually inactive, since sell orders may only come from the zero-measure set of sophis-
ticated investors who receive information at no cost: for brevity, we will refer to this as
an \inactive market". In the Appendix we derive the conditions under which (A) or (B)
are equilibria, by checking whether an individual liquidity trader wishes to deviate from
his assumed strategy (we do not need to check deviations by other players, since by the
sequential nature of the game their strategies are optimal). We prove that:
Proposition 1 In the opaque regime, there are three cases: (i) if R  ,
there is a unique equilibrium where the ABS market is active; (ii) if R 2

;max

2C + ; + 2
(1 )
i
, there are two equilibria, one where the ABS market
is inactive and one where it is active; (iii) otherwise (R > max

2C + ; + 2
(1 )

),
there is a unique equilibrium where the ABS market is inactive.
The results in this proposition are illustrated in Figure 2: the probability of the
{ 23 {liquidity shock  is measured along the horizontal axis, and the informational rent in the
secondary market R along the vertical axis. For R < , the informational rent in the ABS
market is so small compared to the discount in the alternative market that a liquidity
trader would participate to the ABS market even if he expected to be the only uninformed
investor. Hence in this case the only equilibrium features an active ABS market. In polar
opposite case where R is above the upper curve in Figure 2, the informational rent in the
ABS market is so high as to exceed both the discount in the alternative market  and
the cost 2C of gathering information about : in this case, liquidity traders will always
prefer to sell an alternative asset, so that the only equilibrium features an active ABS
market. In the intermediate region, instead, there are two symmetric equilibria, one with
inactive and another with active ABS market. This multiplicity results from strategic
complementarity in the liquidity traders' participation decision: the ABS market discount
decreases in the fraction of liquidity traders selling on the market, because this reduces
adverse selection in the ABS market. To overcome this multiplicity of equilibria, we
assume that liquidity traders coordinate on the equilibrium where the ABS market is
active, since its outcome entails a higher welfare for them, being associated with a lower
discount.21
Based on this analysis, we can characterize the equilibrium in each parameter region
by determining the secondary market price of the ABS and the fraction of sophisticated
investors acquiring information:
Proposition 2 In the transparent regime, the secondary market is perfectly liquid, the
ABS price is P B
3 = x
2qB   e x
2(qB2   qB1), and no sophisticated investor invests in infor-
mation ( = 0). In the opaque regime:
{ 24 {(i) if R  2C, the secondary market is perfectly liquid with ABS price equal to P B
3 =
x
2qB, and no sophisticated investor acquires information ( = 0);
(ii) if R 2 (2C;min(2C + ;R1], the secondary market is illiquid, with ABS price equal
to P B
3 = x
2qB   (R   2C), and sophisticated investors acquire information with
probability  2 (0;1);
(iii) if R 2 (R1;R2], the secondary market is illiquid, with ABS price equal to P B
3 =
x
2qB  
(1 )
2+(1 )R, and all sophisticated investors acquire information ( = 1);
(iv) if R > max(2C + ;R2), the secondary market is inactive, with price P B
3 = x
2qB  
R, and no sophisticated investors acquire information ( = 0).
where R1  2C +
(1 )
 C and R2   + 2
(1 ),
The results in Proposition 2 are graphically illustrated in Figure 3 for the opaque
regime, which is the only interesting one because the transparent market is perfectly
liquid for all parameter values. In the lowest region (i), the ABS market is perfectly
liquid, since the rents from information do not compensate for the cost of its collection.
Hence the secondary market price does not contain any discount due to adverse selection.
In the polar opposite region (iv) at the top of the diagram, the ABS market is inactive:
the ABS trades at the largest possible discount, and is sold only by a zero-measure of
sophisticated and informed investors.
There are two intermediate regions, in both of which the ABS market is active but
illiquid. The dierence between them is that in region (ii) sophisticated investors play
a mixed strategy in acquiring information, so that they become informed with a proba-
bility  2 (0;1) and earn zero net rents from such information. In region (iii), instead,
{ 25 {sophisticated investors nd it optimal always to acquire information ( = 1) and earn a
positive net informational rent: this happens if the probability of liquidity trading is suf-
ciently large ( > C=(+C)), since liquidity trading increases the rents to informed
investors. In this area, informational rents R are large enough that informed investors
expect to earn positive net prots (graphically, we are above the downward sloping curve
in Figure 3), but low enough that liquidity traders still want to participate to the ABS
market (graphically, we are below the upward sloping curve in Figure 3).
4 Primary Market Price and Choice of Transparency
With opaqueness, at the issue stage all investors share the same information, so that
there is no underpricing due to adverse selection in the primary market. In contrast,
with transparency sophisticated investors have an informational advantage in bidding
for the ABS, so that unsophisticated investors participate only if the security sells at a
discount.
4.1 Issue Price with Opaqueness
If the realization of  is not disclosed, at stage 1 the two types of investors are on an equal
footing in their valuation of the securities, so that the price is simply the unconditional
risk-adjusted expectation of the ABS payo, pqG+(1 p)xqB=2, minus the expected stage-
3 liquidity costs, namely the product of the default probability 1   p, the probability of
the liquidity shock , and the relevant stage-3 discount. By Proposition 2, this discount
is zero in region (i), and equals R   2C in region (ii),
(1 )
2+(1 )R in region (iii), and 
in region (iv). It is important to notice that in region (iv), where liquidity traders do
not sell the ABS, the relevant stage-3 discount is given by the liquidity traders' cost of
{ 26 {liquidating the alternative asset, , rather than by the larger discount R that they would
have to bear on the ABS market. Hence, the price of the ABS at the issue stage is:
P1;O =
8
> > > <
> > > :
pqG + (1   p)x
2qB if R  2C;
pqG + (1   p)

x
2qB   (R   2C)

if R 2 (2C;min(2C + ;R1)];
pqG + (1   p)
h
x
2qB   
(1 )
2+(1 )R
i
if R 2 (R1;R2];
pqG + (1   p)
 
x
2qB   

if R > max(2C + ;R2);
(16)
4.2 Issue Price with Transparency
With transparency, the equilibrium price in the primary market is such that unsophisti-
cated investors value the asset correctly in expectation, conditional on their information
and on the probability of their bids being successful:
P1;T = V (L) + (1   )V (H); (17)
where  is the probability that unsophisticated investors successfully bid for a low-risk
ABS, if sophisticated investors play their optimal bidding strategy, and V is the risk-
adjusted PDV of the security conditional on the realization of .
Recalling that at stage 1 the ABS is allocated to investors via a uniform price auction,
the probability  with which unsophisticated investors secure a low-risk ABS depends on
the bidding strategy of informed investors, which in turn depends on the realization of
. To see this, consider that for sophisticated investors the value of the ABS is given by
expression (3), so that they are willing to bid a price P > VT() if  = L (i.e. e  =  )
but they place no bids if  = H (i.e. e  = ). As a result, if e  =   both types of
investors bid: sophisticated investors manage to buy the ABS with probability  and the
unsophisticated do so with probability 1 . If e  = , instead, unsophisticated investors
end up buying the ABS with certainty.
Thus the probability of an unsophisticated investor's buying the ABS if e  =   is
{ 27 { = (1   )=(2   ) < 1=2 and, using equation (17), the issue price is
P1;T = pqG + (1   p)

x
2
qB  

2   
R

; (18)
where (1 p)R=(2 ) is the discount required by unsophisticated traders to compensate
for their winner's curse. This price is decreasing in the fraction of sophisticated investors
 and in their informational rent R, as both these parameters tend to exacerbate adverse
selection in the primary market. So with transparency there is no discount due to sec-
ondary market illiquidity, but there is underpricing arising from adverse selection in the
primary market.
4.3 Face Value of the ABS
The expressions (16) and (18) for the issue price are predicated on the assumption that
the issuer sets the face value of the ABS equal to its payo in the good state, that is,
F = 1. Clearly, choosing F < 1 would reduce the proceeds from the sale of the ABS.
Since the issuer invests any proceeds from the sale of the ABS at a net return r > 0, he
wants to choose F as high as possible while avoiding default in the good state. Hence,
he will set F = 1 independently of the choice of transparency (to be analyzed in the next
section). This veries the assumption made in Section 2.1 about the face value of the
ABS.
4.4 Choice of Transparency
Initially, the issuer chooses the disclosure regime that maximizes the issue price. This
choice boils down to comparing expressions (16) and (18). As shown in the Appendix,
the result is that:
{ 28 {Proposition 3 Issuers choose opaqueness for all parameter values.
The intuition for this nding is that under opaqueness the costs due to adverse se-
lection are borne \less often" than under transparency: under opaqueness, the discount
due to adverse selection is paid by investors only when they are hit by a liquidity shock,
which only happens with frequency ; under transparency, instead, the adverse selection
problem arises on the primary market, and therefore invariably leads to a discounted
issue price. Proposition 3 implies that the issue price of the ABS is simply the initial
price under the opaque regime, P1;O given in expression (16)
What is left to analyze is whether the issuer, who is the initial owner of the loan
portfolio, will want to sell it as an ABS or hold it to maturity on his books. If he holds
it to maturity, his payo would be VO because he does not know ; if instead he sells
the ABS and reinvests the proceeds, he will gain (1 + r)P1. Hence, the net gain from
securitization is:
(1 + r)P1   VO = rVO  
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if R  2C;
(1 + r)(1   p)(R   2C) if R 2 (2C;min(2C + ;R1)];
(1 + r)(1   p)
(1 )
2+(1 )R if R 2 (R1;R2]
(1 + r)(1   p) if R > max(2C + ;R2);
(19)
where for brevity we replace the unconditional risk-adjusted expectation of the ABS
payo pqG +
1 p
2 xqB with VO, by (2). To make the problem interesting, we assume that
the rate of return r that the issuer can obtain on alternative assets is high enough as to
make the net gain (19) positive, this inducing him to issue the ABS at stage 1.
4.5 The Crisis
It is interesting to consider what the model can tell us about the ABS market in the
2007-08 nancial crisis. This can be analyzed by looking at the behavior of the secondary
{ 29 {market prices as the economy moves from stage 1 to stage 3, that is, as it becomes known
that the ABS will not repay its face value.
If default is announced at stage 3, the market price will obviously drop because of the
negative revision in fundamentals, even if the market stays liquid because informational
rents are low (R  2C). But, if informational rents are larger (R > 2C), the ABS
price drops further due to the illiquidity of the market. Drawing the secondary market
price P B
3;O from Proposition 2 and the primary market price P1;O from equation (16), one
obtains the following expression for the price change:
P
B
3;O P1;O =  p(qG 
x
2
qB) 
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if R  2C;
[1   (1   p)](R   2C) if R 2 (2C;min(2C + ;R1)];
[1   (1   p)]
(1 )
2+(1 )R if R 2 (R1;R2];
[R   (1   p)] if R > max(2C + ;R2):
(20)
Equation (20) indicates that if informational rents are suciently high, the announce-
ment of the ABS default can trigger a market crash and the transition from a liquid
primary market to an illiquid or inactive secondary market. This is what Gorton (2010)
describes as a \panic", that is, a situation in which structured debt securities turn from
being informationally insensitive to informationally sensitive, and \some agents are will-
ing to spend resources to learn private information to speculate on the value of these
securities ... This makes them illiquid" (p. 36-37).22 It is worth underscoring that this
steep price decline and drying up of liquidity would not occur if the initial sale were
conducted in a transparent fashion.
The nancial crisis of 2007-08 featured rst a drop in ABS prices and then a market
freeze. In our model, this would occur if the rents from informed trading were to rise over
time, moving the economy rst into the illiquidity region and then into the region where
{ 30 {the ABS market becomes inactive. This increase in R may arise from an increase in the
variability of the risk sensitivity of ABS (), in the discrepancy between the marginal
value of consumption in the two default states (qB2  qB1), or from both: in other words,
greater uncertainty about the quality of ABS, the gravity of the recession, or both. This
argument also illustrates why the drop in ABS prices and the market freeze occurred only
for non-agency MBS, which were not insured against default risk, and not for agency MBS,
which were insured by government agencies: in our setting the dierence in exposure to
credit risk of the two types of securities would be captured by a larger value of  for
non-agency than for agency MBS.
5 Public Policy
The social value of liquidity may exceed the private value  placed on liquidity by
distressed investors. As we saw in Section 2.4, this point is captured by denoting the
social value of stage-3 liquidity as (1+), where  measures the intensity of the liquidity
externalities, and therefore the deadweight loss of secondary market illiquidity. This
creates the potential for welfare-enhancing public policies. A regulator can intervene ex
ante by imposing on issuers mandatory transparency on the primary market, or ex post
by injecting liquidity at the stage of secondary market trading. This liquidity injection
can be targeted to investors hit by the liquidity shock or aimed at supporting the price
on the ABS market. In this section we illustrate the eects of these interventions on
transparency and social welfare.
{ 31 {5.1 Mandating Transparency
Suppose the government can mandate transparency at the issue stage, by forcing the
issuer to disclose information  at the issue stage: in which parameter regions is this
socially ecient? The rst step in answering is to dene social welfare. Notice that in
this model any prots made by sophisticated investors come either at the expense of the
issuer (in the primary market) or at expense of liquidity traders; and in turn any losses
inicted on liquidity traders are initially borne by the issuers in the form of a lower issue
price. Hence, in the absence of externalities, social welfare is measured by the expected
value of the issuer's net payo:
W = (1 + r)E(P1)   VO; (21)
where the value of P1 will dier depending on the transparency regime: it is P1;T in (18)
under transparency, and P1;O in (16) under opaqueness.
Under transparency, the secondary market is always liquid, so that there are no ex-
ternalities due to illiquidity. Hence, social welfare is
WT = rVO   (1 + r)(1   p)

2   
R; (22)
which shows that in this regime ineciency arises only from adverse selection in the
primary market (captured by the second term). With opaqueness, instead, welfare is
WO = rVO  
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if R  2C;
(1 + r)(1   p)(R   2C) if R 2 (2C;min(2C + ;R1)];
(1 + r)(1   p)
(1 )
2+(1 )R if R 2 (R1;R2];
(1 + r + )(1   p) if R > max(2C + ;R2):
(23)
This expression shows that in the opaque regime ineciencies may arise from adverse
selection in the secondary market, and that the externality from illiquidity contributes
{ 32 {to lower welfare in the region where the ABS market is inactive (as indicated by the
presence of the parameter  in the bottom line).
The socially optimal choice depends on the comparison between expressions (22) and
(23). The result of this comparison is obvious for all the cases in which there is no
illiquidity externality: in these cases, opaqueness is the socially preferable regime, since
social welfare coincides with the issuer's payo, which by Proposition 3 is larger under
opaqueness. A dierence between social welfare and issuers' private payo exists only in
the region where the ABS market is inactive and the liquidity externality arises. Graph-
ically, this occurs in the top region of Figure 4, where R > max

2C + ; + 2
(1 )

,
which is shown in Figure 4 as an upward sloping convex curve.
In this region, the social gain from transparency WT   WO is the sum of the issuer's
net gain (1+ r)[

2 R   ] and the social gain . Transparency is therefore socially
optimal in the region where R <
2 

 
1 +

1+r

, whose upper bound in Figure 4 is a
straight line in the space (;R). Hence, the region where transparency is socially { but
not privately { optimal is the shaded area in Figure 4. It is easy to show that this region
is non-empty for suciently large values of the externality parameter  relative to the
private rate of return r. To summarize:
Proposition 4 Mandating transparency increases welfare if and only if R 2

max

2C + ; + 2
(1 )

;
2 

 
1 +

1+r



.
Notice that, according to this proposition, mandating transparency is not universally
welfare-improving. Quite to the contrary, it is never ecient in the area where the
market is active even if illiquid, that is, whenever the informational rents are suciently
low. Therefore, such a prescription would not apply to ABS that feature little credit risk
{ 33 {and therefore low information sensitivity, such as agency MBS, while it might apply to
riskier and potentially information sensitive ones, such as non-agency MBS.
Mandating transparency is not the only public policy that can address the ineciency
arising from the lack of transparency. Another type of eective policy would be for the
government to precommit to gathering and disseminating information about the ABS's
risk sensitivity  at the stage of secondary market trading. This would enable issuers to
reap the benets from opaqueness on the primary market while avoiding the attendant
costs in terms of secondary market illiquidity. In principle, issuers themselves may wish to
commit to such a delayed transparency policy, but such a promise may not be credible on
their part: ex post they may actually have the incentive to reveal their information about
 to a sophisticated investor so as to share into his informational rents from secondary
market trading.
5.2 Liquidity Provision to Distressed Investors
An alternative form of policy intervention is to relieve the liquidity shortage when the
secondary market is inactive at t = 3, that is, when R > max

2C + ; 2
(1+) + 

.
In this case ABS holders hit by the liquidity shock choose to sell other assets at the \re-
sale" discount . Hence, the government may target liquidity L   to these distressed
investors, for instance by purchasing their assets at a discount    L rather than .
In the limiting case L = , it would make their assets perfectly liquid. Alternatively,
the government may acquire stakes in the equity of distressed ABS holders and thereby
reduce the need for re sales of assets. In either case, the liquidity injection reduces the
reservation value of liquidity from  to    L. This has a social cost (1 + )L, where
the parameter  > 0 captures the cost of the distortionary taxes needed to nance the
{ 34 {added liquidity.
How large should the liquidity injection L be when the ABS market is inactive? In
this case, social welfare has three components: (i) the net value of the ABS, rVO   (1 +
r)(1   p)(   L); (ii) the negative externality  (1 + r)(1   p)(   L); and (iii) the
expected cost of distortionary taxation  (1 + )(1   p)L. Therefore, social welfare is
W = rVO   (1 + r + )(1   p)(   L)   (1 + )(1   p)L: (24)
If the government chooses L 2 [0;] so as to maximize W, its optimal liquidity injection
is
L
 =
8
<
:
0 if  > r + ;
L 2 [0;] if  = r + ;
 if  < r + :
(25)
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 5 The public provision of liquidity to traders who need liquidity is welfare-
enhancing if R > max

2C + ; 2
(1+) + 

and  < r + .
Providing liquidity to distressed ABS holders is optimal in the entire \inactive market"
region in Figure 4 (which combines the light and dark grey areas), provided that the net
benets from ex-post liquidity (given by the sum of the net proceeds from the ABS
sale r and the liquidity externality ) exceeds the net costs of liquidity (given by the
marginal cost of taxes ). If this condition is satised, the region where the ex-post
injection of liquidity is optimal is larger than the area where transparency of optimal
(the dark grey area in Figure 4). This happens because imposing transparency reduces
the proceeds for ABS issuers. Conversely, ex-post liquidity provision does not aect
the proceeds from the ABS sale. However, it is important to realize that, in the dark
grey area, where investors are more likely to need secondary market liquidity (high ),
{ 35 {mandating transparency ex ante dominates ex-post liquidity provision: here, not only
transparency dominates opaqueness, but it removes the need for ex-post intervention and
thus avoids distortionary taxes. In the light grey area where investors are less likely to
need liquidity (low ), instead, mandatory transparency is unwarranted, while ex-post
provision of liquidity is socially optimal, provided that  < r + . Hence, our model
provides a role for both ex-ante mandatory disclosure and for ex-post liquidity provision.
5.3 Public Price Support in the ABS Market
In the previous section, the government was assumed to target the liquidity injection to
the investors hit by a liquidity shock. Alternatively, the government may intervene to
support the market price for ABS without targeting liquidity sellers, either by standing to
buy the ABS at a per-set price or by subsidizing market makers. This was the main feature
of the initial version of Paulson plan in the U.S., which envisaged \reverse auctions" aimed
at buying back securitized loans from banks { a plan later replaced by an approach
targeted at recapitalizing distressed banks, and thus closer to the intervention described
in the previous section. However, in July 2009 the Federal Reserve started engaging in
forms of indirect support of the ABS market, by providing cheap loans to investors such
as hedge funds for the purchase of commercial MBS. In this section, we consider what
should be the eect of such a public intervention in the ABS market.
Since in our setting a negative externality arises only when the ABS market is inactive,
it is natural to assume that the government intervenes only in this case, that is, only
when R > max

2C + ; 2
(1+) + 

. The least-cost government policy to keep the
ABS market active is buying the ABS at a discount  (or at slightly higher price, so as to
break the indierence of the liquidity traders). In other words, the government replaces
{ 36 {the market makers at t = 3 and buys the ABS at the price
P
B
3;O =
x
2
qB   : (26)
This relieves the investors hit by a liquidity shock but also increases the sophisticated
investors' incentive to acquire information. To see this, consider that now the net prot
that sophisticated investors can expect from information gathering is:
i
2
(R   )   Ci; (27)
where the rst term is the gain that the informed investor obtains from selling at the
price (26) the ABS, whose true value in the bad state is x
2qB   R. As before, informed
investors obtain this gain only with probability 1=2, namely when the information about
 is negative. From the rst-order condition, the equilibrium probability of becoming
informed is

 =
8
<
:
0 if R < 2C + ;
 2 [0;1] if R = 2C + ;
1 if R > 2C + :
(28)
In the parameter region where the government intervenes (R >
max

2C + ; 2
(1+) + 

), the bottom inequality in (28) always holds, so that
the expression simplies to  = 1. Hence, sophisticated investors always gather
information.
How does the government decide whether to intervene? The gains from intervention
come from avoiding the negative externality which costs (1   p) to society. The
cost is the deadweight loss associated with the taxes that the government must raise to
cover its market-making losses in the secondary market. In its market-making activity,
the government gains (1   p) from liquidity traders but loses (1   )(1   p)R 
2 to
sophisticated investors. Because R >  2
(1+) + , on balance it loses money.
{ 37 {Notice that the intervention in the secondary market does not change the issue price
since the government is buying the ABS at the same discount () that the liquidity
traders would suer by selling the alternative asset.
Hence, the government's choice about whether to support the ABS market depends
on whether  

(1   )R 
2   

is positive. Re-expressing this inequality as an
upper bound on R, the government will support the ABS market if
R  

1 +
2
(1   )

1 +



: (29)
Recalling that R must also be large enough to place the economy in the region where the
ABS market would otherwise be inactive, we have the following:
Proposition 6 It is optimal for the government to provide price support to the ABS
market if R 2

max

2C + ; 2
(1+) + 

; + 2
(1 )
 
1 +




i
.
This result is illustrated in Figure 5, where the region where ex-post intervention in
the ABS market is socially ecient is shaded in dark grey. The size of this region is
increasing in ,  and , namely in the private and social value of liquidity: indeed, this
locus would disappear if  = 0. Conversely, its size is decreasing in the magnitude of , C
and : intuitively, a large  implies that government intervention is socially more costly,
a large C reduces the scope for such intervention because sophisticated investors have
little incentive to seek information anyway, and a large  increases the adverse selection
cost that the government faces in supporting the ABS market.
It is worth noticing that the region where ABS price support by the government is
optimal (the dark grey area in Figure 5) is smaller than the area where liquidity provision
targeted to distressed investors is optimal (which also includes the light grey area in Figure
{ 38 {5). Both policies eliminate the negative externality. But they dier in another respect:
targeting liquidity at distressed investors raises the ABS issue price (which produces a
social gain r), without generating prots for sophisticated investors; in contrast, giving
public support to the secondary market price leaves the ABS issue price unaected, and
instead increases sophisticated investors' informational rents, and thus their incentive to
seek information (which yields no social benet, and may cause social losses).
6 Extensions
In this section we explore two extensions of the basic model. First, we endogenize the
liquidity discount  and the externality : we assume that investors in ABS securities
also own real assets that are directly used in production, and may have to liquidate
them at a discount if adverse selection in the secondary market for ABS is too severe.
Liquidation of these assets disrupts the productivity of other input suppliers, such as
employees used to work with these assets, so that extreme adverse selection in the ABS
market generates a deadweight loss for society.
Second, we endogenize the fraction of sophisticated investors to deliver predictions on
which markets can be expected have more of them. We suppose that investors choose
whether to become sophisticated at some cost before knowing the degree of asymmetric
information R associated with the security and the probability of the liquidity shock .
6.1 Endogenous Value of Liquidity
Recall that, if the secondary market for the ABS were perfectly liquid, in the opaque
regime sellers hit by a liquidity shock could sell their holdings in default states at the fair
price qBx=2. Suppose that this is precisely the sum of money that they need to oset
{ 39 {their liquidity shock. If instead the ABS is illiquid and were to sell at a discount larger
than  o this fair value, these investors abstain from selling the ABS, being able to
liquidate an alternative asset in their portfolio at the re-sale discount . However, the
liquidation of this alternative asset is associated with a deadweight cost  for society.
In this section, we endogenize both the private and the social value of liquidity, by
assuming that the alternative asset owned by investors is a real asset used in production
by a rm that they own, for instance a piece of manufacturing equipment or a plot of
farmland. If an investor hit by the liquidity shock chooses to sell this alternative asset,
he will need to sell enough of it as to raise the amount qBx=2. But, having invested in
rm-specic know-how, the asset is more valuable to him than to potential acquirers.
Specically, assume that to the current rm owner the value of a unit of this asset is vH,
which exceeds the price vL at which it can be sold to a potential buyer. To cover his need
for liquidity, the owner would need to sell k units of this productive asset, with k =
qBx
2vL.
Hence, adopting the terminology used before, the re-sale discount on this alternative
asset is  =
qBx
2
vH vL
vL .
Now suppose that this productive asset is used jointly with labor { for simplicity, in
equal proportions { and that, just like the owner of the rm, workers made rm-specic
investments in human capital, which allow them to earn a quasi-rent w. Thus, liquidating
k units of productive capital implies ring k workers, who collectively lose kw. This loss is
not internalized by ABS holders when they choose to liquidate productive capital instead
of their illiquid ABS. Hence, the re sale induced by an illiquid ABS market generates a
negative externality  =
qBx
2vLw. The intensity of the externality,  = w
vH vL, is the ratio
between the workers' loss w and the entrepreneur's loss vH   vL per unit of productive
capital being liquidated. The analysis in Proposition 3 and 4 follows unchanged with
{ 40 {these specic values for  and .
6.2 Endogenous Sophistication
So far the proportion  of sophisticated investors who buy a security has been treated as a
parameter. In this section, we extend the model to encompass investors' choice to become
sophisticated before the securities are issued, so that the fraction  of sophisticated
investors is determined endogenously in equilibrium. A rst result follows immediately
from the previous analysis: whenever the government mandates transparency, there is
no scope for incurring any cost to become nancially sophisticated, because there are no
rents to be had in secondary market trading. The fraction  of sophisticated investors
can be positive only when the secondary market is expected to be opaque: sophisticated
investors gain from opaqueness, just as issuers do (by Proposition 3). The next question
is: assuming opaqueness, under which circumstances should we expect more investment in
nancial sophistication, and thus greater adverse selection in secondary market trading?
Recall that sophisticated investors earn positive net prots from investing in informa-
tion only if R 2

2C +
(1 )
 C; + 2
(1 )
i
, which corresponds to region (iii) in Figure
3: only in this region they have the incentive to become sophisticated. To make the prob-
lem interesting, we assume that the decision about whether to become sophisticated or
not is made under uncertainty. Specically, we assume that at date t =  1 (before securi-
ties are issued) each investor i 2 [0;1] chooses how much to spend on nancial education:
by spending more on it, the investor raises the probability i of becoming sophisticated.
For concreteness, the cost borne by the investor is taken to be a linear function si of
the probability of becoming sophisticated, where the parameter s determines how costly
nancial education is. When this decision is made, investors are assumed to be still un-
{ 41 {certain about the degree of asymmetric information R associated with the ABS to be
issued. Specically, R is a Bernoulli-distributed random variable, which can take values

0;R
	
with  being the probability that R = R.
Denoting the expected gain from being sophisticated by g (yet to be determined),
each investor i will choose the investment in nancial education { and therefore the level
of i { that maximizes his net gain from nancial education, gi si:The expected gain
g from being sophisticated is
g = (1   p)(1   )


2 + (1   )
R   C

(30)
if R 2

2C +
(1 )
 C; + 2
(1 )
i
, and is zero otherwise. To understand this expres-
sion, notice that the term in square brackets is the rent that sophisticated investors earn
from information, given by expression (13) if i =  = 1 (which is the case in the region
being considered). This rent accrues to sophisticated investors only if there is default
(which happens with probability 1   p), if they are not hit by a liquidity shock (which
happens with probability 1 ), and if R = R (which happens with probability ), since
for R = 0 there is no informational rent to be gained.
In the Appendix we prove the following results:
Proposition 7 If the cost of nancial education is suciently high (s > s) and
the maximum informational rent suciently large (R > 2C + 2s
(1 p)(1 )), there is
a unique symmetric equilibrium where the fraction of sophisticated investors is  =

1 
h
R
s
(1 p)(1 )+C   2
i
> 0. If instead R < 2C + 2s
(1 p)(1 ), the unique symmetric equi-
librium features no sophisticated investors ( = 0). For all other parameter values (s < s
and R > 2C + 2s
(1 p)(1 )), there is no symmetric equilibrium:
{ 42 {The threshold s mentioned in Proposition 7 is computed in the Appendix. The in-
tuitive rationale for our results is as follows. If R < 2C + 2s
(1 p)(1 ), the expected
rent from becoming sophisticated is not large enough to cover the costs of nancial ed-
ucation, so that investors have no incentive to become sophisticated. Conversely, when
R > 2C + 2s
(1 p)(1 ), the rent from becoming sophisticated is high enough to induce
investment in nancial education. However, this is an equilibrium only if the cost of
becoming sophisticated is high enough (s > s) to prevent excessive competition for these
informational rents. If this condition on the cost of nancial education is not met (s < s),
there is no equilibrium: intuitively, the fraction of informed investors { and thus adverse
selection in the ABS market { would be so high that liquidity traders would be driven
out of the market.
The most interesting case is that in which s > s and R > 2C + 2s
(1 p)(1 ), so that
in equilibrium there is a positive fraction  of sophisticated investors. From the expres-
sion for  in Proposition 7, it is easy to see that the fraction of sophisticated investors
is increasing in the likelihood 1   p of default states (because only in these states the
ABS becomes informationally sensitive and thus can yield informational rents), in the
likelihood  and magnitude R of the informational rent (which both increase the payo
to nancial sophistication), and in the probability of liquidity trading  (since informed
investors gain at the expense of liquidity traders). Hence, investment in nancial so-
phistication is elicited by the issuance of risky and informationally sensitive securities,
and/or by the expectation of a strong volume of liquidity trading. Conversely, as one
would expect, the fraction of sophisticated investors is decreasing in the cost parameter
of nancial education s and in the cost C of acquiring information.
{ 43 {7 Conclusions
Is there a conict between expanding the placement of complex nancial instruments
and preserving the transparency and liquidity of their secondary markets? Put more
bluntly, is \popularizing nance" at odds with \keeping nancial markets a safe place"?
The subprime crisis has thrown this question for the designers of nancial regulation into
high relief.
The answer we provide is that indeed the conict exists, and that it may be particu-
larly relevant to the securitization process. Marketing large amounts of ABS means selling
them also to unsophisticated investors, who cannot process the information necessary to
price them. In fact, if such information were released, it would put them at a disadvan-
tage vis- a-vis the \smart money" that can process it. This creates an incentive for ABS
issuers to negotiate with credit rating agencies a low level of transparency { that is, rela-
tively coarse and uninformative ratings. Ironically, the elimination of some price-relevant
information is functional to enhanced liquidity in the ABS new issue market.
However, opaqueness at the issue stage comes at the cost of a less liquid, or even
totally frozen-up, secondary market, and of sharper price decline in case of default. This
is because with poor transparency sophisticated investors may succeed in procuring the
undisclosed information. Therefore, trading in the secondary market will be hampered
by adverse selection, while with transparency this would not occur.
Though privately optimal, opaqueness may be socially inecient if the illiquidity
of the secondary market has negative repercussions on the economy, as by triggering a
spiral of defaults and bankruptcies. In this case, regulation making greater disclosure
mandatory for rating agencies is socially optimal. Our model therefore oers support for
{ 44 {current regulatory eorts to increase disclosure of credit rating agencies. However, it also
indicates that there are situations in which opaqueness is socially optimal, for instance
when the rents from private information are too low to shut down the secondary market
or when its liquidity has little value.
We also show that, when opaqueness results in a frozen-up secondary market, ex-post
public liquidity provision may be warranted, and that targeting such liquidity to distressed
bondholders is preferable to providing it via support to the ABS secondary market price.
The reason is that by supporting ABS prices, public policy ends up enhancing the trading
prots of sophisticated investors, and thus subsidizes their information collection eort,
which is not benecial and may actually be harmful from a social standpoint. Anyway,
whenever transparency is socially ecient, ex-ante mandatory transparency makes any
form of ex-post liquidity provision unnecessary, thus sparing society the cost of the implied
distortionary taxes.
Finally, we extend the analysis by endogenizing two parameters of the baseline model
of this paper. First, we show that the liquidity externality assumed in the model can
arise from the fact that an illiquid ABS market can trigger re sales of productive assets,
and thereby the socially wasteful loss of workers' rm-specic human capital. Second, we
endogenize the proportion of sophisticated investors, by assuming investors can invest in
nancial education before the issuance of securities.
Interestingly, the problems analyzed in this paper { the complexity of the information
required to invest in ABS and its implications for liquidity { have resurfaced as investors
and policy makers debated how to restart securitizations after the crisis. A recent article
in the Financial Times reports: \Investors want to buy more securitizations but many
admit that they cannot fully analyze deals" (Hughes, 2010), while a 2009 public consul-
{ 45 {tation launched by the European Central Bank on loan-by-loan information requirements
for ABS reveals that for the vast majority of market participants \the provision of more
detailed information would help the market assess the risks associated with ABS ... it
would unquestionably benet all types of investors, as well as the general level of liquidity
in the market" (ECB, 2010, p. 1).
{ 46 {Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider rst candidate equilibrium (A). If all liquidity traders
choose to sell the alternative asset, they will not sell the ABS and therefore the price is
given by expression (11). Hence, if any of them were to deviate by selling the ABS, he
would suer a loss R. This is to be compared to the discount  that he would face on
the alternative asset: hence, he will not deviate if R > . So (A) is an equilibrium if
R > .
Let us now consider candidate equilibrium (B). If all liquidity traders choose to sell
the ABS, individual deviations will not be protable if the discount in the ABS market
(from equation (10)) does not exceed the reservation value  in the alternative market,
namely if
 
(1   )
2 + (1   )
R: (A1)
Substituting for  from expression (15), we nd that this condition becomes
 
8
> <
> :
0 if R < 2C;
R   2C if R 2

2C;2C + 1 
 C

;
(1 )
2+(1 )R if R > 2C + 1 
 C:
(A2)
This condition implies that the set of strategies (B) are an equilibrium if either R < 2C
or R 2

2C;min(2C + ;2C + 1 
 C)

or R 2

2C + 1 
 C; + 2
(1 )
i
. Hence,
more compactly, equilibrium (B) exists if R  max

2C + ; + 2
(1 )

.
Summarizing, (A) is the only equilibrium if R > max

2C + ; + 2
(1 )

;
(B) is the only equilibrium if R  ; both (A) and (B) are equilibria if R 2

;max

2C + ; + 2
(1 )
i
.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that in the transparent regime P B
3 is given by equation
(8), and since information about  is already impounded in P B
3 , sophisticated have no
{ 47 {reason to acquire it.
In the opaque regime, consider rst the case in which equilibrium (A) is played because
R > max(2C + ; + 2
(1 )). In this case,  = 0 and P B
3 = x
2qB   R.
In all other cases (where R  max(2C +;+ 2
(1 ))), equilibrium (B) is played,
so that  is given by equation (15) and P B
3 by equation (10). Hence:

 =
8
> > <
> > :
0 if R < 2C;

(1 )
 
R
C   2

if R 2
h
2C;min(2C + ;2C +
(1 )
 C)
i
;
1 if R 2 (2C +
(1 )
 C; + 2
(1 )]:
(A3)
and
P
B
3 =
8
> > <
> > :
xqB
2 if R < 2C;
xqB
2   (R   2C) if R 2
h
2C;min(2C + ;2C +
(1 )
 C)
i
;
xqB
2  
(1 )
2+(1 )R if R 2 (2C +
(1 )
 C; + 2
(1 )]:
(A4)
Proof of Proposition 3. The dierence in issue price between opaqueness and trans-
parency is:
P1;O P1;T =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
(1   p)

2 R > 0 if R  2C;
(1   p)
h

2 R   (R   2C)
i
if R 2 (2C;min(2C + ;2C +
(1 )
 C)];
(1   p)
h

2    
(1 )
2+(1 )
i
R if R 2

2C +
(1 )
 C; + 2
(1 )
i
;
(1   p)
h

2 R   
i
if R > max(2C + ; + 2
(1 )):
(A5)
There are four cases to consider, which correspond to the four regions in Figure 3:
Region (i): In this region where R  2C, the issuer chooses opaqueness. As the
prots from information do not compensate for the cost of its collection, the secondary
market is perfectly liquid. Hence, the issuer's only concern is to avoid underpricing in
the primary market, which is achieved by choosing opaqueness.
Region (ii): In the intermediate region where R 2
(2C;min

2C + ;2C +
(1 )
 C

], the discount associated with transparency is
{ 48 {R
2 , whereas the discount with opaqueness is (R   2C). Hence, the regime with
transparency dominates if R

  

2 

> 2C or R > 2C
 

2 
. This condition is violated,
because 2C
 

2 
 2C +
(1 )
 C and in this region R  2C +
(1 )
 C. Thus in this region
opaqueness is optimal.
Region (iii): In the intermediate region where R 2

2C +
(1 )
 C; + 2
(1 )
i
,
the discount associated with transparency is
R
2 , whereas the discount with opaqueness
is 
(1 )
2+(1 )R. It is easy to show that

2   
(1 )
2+(1 ). Hence, also in this region
opaqueness is optimal.
Region (iv): In the top region where R > max

2C + ; + 2
(1 )

, opaqueness
is also optimal. To see this, consider that by choosing opaqueness, the issuer bears
the expected liquidity cost , while saving the underpricing cost

2 R. Transparency
dominates only if R <
(2 )
 . This condition is violated, because in this region R >
 + 2
(1 ) and we can show that  + 2
(1 ) 
(2 )
 , which proves the result.
In conclusion, in no region transparency is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 7. Each investor i chooses i non-cooperatively, taking the choice
of  made by other investors as given. Since the gain g from nancial sophistication
depends on the fraction  of sophisticated investors but not on the individual probability
i, each investor i will take g as given in his choice. Hence, each investor i solves the
following problem:
max
i2[0;1]
gi   si; (A6)
subject to
g =
(
(1   p)(1   )
h

2+(1 )R   C
i
if R 2
h
2C + 1 
 C; + 2
(1 )
i
;
0 otherwise.
(A7)
{ 49 {Since the objective function is convex in i, the necessary and sucient condition for a
maximum is
i =
8
<
:
0 if g < s;
 2 [0;1] if g = s;
1 if g > s:
(A8)
In a symmetric equilibrium i = . In equilibrium,  cannot be equal to 1: in this case all
investors would be sophisticated and thus there would be no informational rent, which in
turn implies that the optimal choice would be i = 0, leading to a contradiction. Hence,
in a symmetric equilibrium  must be either 0 or take a value between 0 and 1 such that
g = s. The condition for  = 0 to be an equilibrium is obtained by replacing expression
(A7) in the condition g < s:
R < 2

C +
s
(1   p)(1   )

: (A9)
The condition for  2 (0;1) to be an equilibrium is obtained by replacing expression (A7)
in the condition g = s:
 =

1   
"
R
C + s
(1 p)(1 )
  2
#
: (A10)
Expression (A10) is positive if and only if R  2
h
C + s
(1 p)(1 )
i
, and it is smaller than
1 if and only if R <
h
C + s
(1 p)(1 )
i 
1 + 1


. The latter constraint is satised if and
only if
s >
(1   p)(1   )
1 + 

R   (1   )C

 s: (A11)
Summarizing, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where  equals

 =
8
<
:
0 if R < 2
h
C + s
(1 p)(1 )
i
;

1 
h
R
C+ s
(1 p)(1 )
  2
i
if R  2
h
C + s
(1 p)(1 )
i
and s > s;
(A12)
while there is no symmetric equilibrium if R  2
h
C + s
(1 p)(1 )
i
and s < s.
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Figure 2. Secondary market equilibria with opacity. 
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Figure 3. Characterizing secondary market equilibrium regions with opacity. 
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Figure 4. Socially optimal choice of transparency. 
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Figure 5. Social optimality of ABS price support. 
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{ 60 {Notes
1Ratings were coarse also in the sense that they were based on a very limited number of loan-level
variables, to the point of neglecting indicators with considerable predictive power (Ashcraft, Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Vickery, 2010). Indeed, it was only in 2007 that Moody's requested from issuers loan-level
data that itself considered to be \primary", such as a borrower's debt-to-income (DTI) level, the appraisal
type, and the identity of the lender that originated the loan (Moody's, 2007). In addition, rating agencies
failed to re-estimate their models over time to take into account the worsening of the loan pool induced
by securitizations themselves (Rajan, Seru and Vig, 2008).
2This insight is consistent with the results by Fahri, Lerner and Tirole (2008), who present a model
where sellers of a product of uncertain quality buy certication services from information certiers. In
their setting, sellers always prefer certication to be transparent rather than opaque.
3The point that disclosing information about ABS may hinder their liquidity is also made intuitively
by Holmstrom (2008).
4In keeping with this argument, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) show that earnings announcements lead
to lower market liquidity if they allow sophisticated traders to increase their informational advantage
over other traders. The same argument is used by Goel and Thakor (2003) to rationalize earning
smoothing: to maintain a liquid market for their stocks, companies will smooth earnings so as to reduce
the informational rents of sophisticated investors. A similar argument is used by Fishman and Hagerty
(2003) to discuss the welfare implications of voluntary and mandatory disclosure.
5An often-quoted example of the same practice is the sale of wholesale diamonds by de Beers: di-
amonds are sold in pre-arranged packets (\sights") at non-negotiable prices. This selling method may
eliminate the adverse selection costs that would arise if diamond buyers were allowed to negotiate a price
contingent on the packets' content. Another (possibly complementary) rationale for \block booking"
sales is that it avoids the duplication of information processing costs by investors, as argued by French
and McCormick (1984).
6This is witnessed by a survey conducted by the Committee on the Global Financial System in 2005:
\Interviews with large institutional investors in structured nance instruments suggest that they do not
rely on ratings as the sole source of information for their investment decisions ... Indeed, the relatively
coarse lter a summary rating provides is seen, by some, as an opportunity to trade ner distinctions
of risk within a given rating band. Nevertheless, rating agency `approval' still appears to determine the
marketability of a given structure to a wider market" (p. 3).
{ 61 {7The point that opaqueness may encourage information collection by investors has already surfaced in
the literature. For instance, Goldman (2005) shows that investors may have greater incentives to acquire
information about a conglomerate rm than about single-division rms. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990),
Boot and Thakor (1993), and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) show that security design aects investors'
incentives to acquire information by changing the information sensitivity of the security issued. We do
not study security design in this paper.
8Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) make a similar point on the eect of deposit insurance on the liquidity
of bank debt and deposits.
9Another dierence is that our unsophisticated investors rationally take into account their unsophis-
tication in their investment decisions, while rating shopping models assume some na ve investors who
are gullied by inated ratings.
10The assumption that the two bad states occur with equal probability is completely inessential to our
results, and is made only for notational simplicity.
11We assume the two loans to have negatively correlated payos across defaults states in order to
emphasize the portfolio's correlation as the source of uncertainty, holding its expected payo constant.
The results are qualitatively unaected if one loan has greater exposure to default states than the other,
i.e. it repays x in state B1 and 0 in state B2, while the other repays x in both states B1 and B2. In this
case, the safer loan would also pay a larger expected payo.
12The high cost is because the payo of each claim has an idiosyncratic random component that is
known to the issuer and can be certied by the rating agency at a cost but unknown to investors. So
overcoming adverse selection problems would require each individual claim to be rated by the agency {
as noted, a prohibitive expense. Pooling the claims diversies away this idiosyncratic risk, removing the
need for the rating agency to perform the detailed assessment.
13The assumption that the issuer is less informed about its asset than some specialized investors is
commonplace in the literature on IPOs (e.g. Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), and is also made by Dow,
Goldstein, and Guembel (2007) and Hennessy (2008), who show that companies may gain information
about their investment opportunities from market prices. The assumption that rating agencies are also
unable to extract information about  from available data is in line with the fact that before the crisis
they did not adjust their ratings to reect changes in the sensitivity of ABS to aggregate risk, and
that much evidence has underscored the limitations of their credit scoring models (Ashcraft et al., 2009,
Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009, and Johnson et al., 2009).
{ 62 {14The relevant constraint arises when  = L. In fact, if AS 2 (PDV (H);PDV (L)], sophisticated
investors can buy the entire issue if  = H at its PDV. If instead  = L , sophisticated investors
are not wealthy enough, so unsophisticated investors are needed. However, the latter cannot distinguish
between the two scenarios and can only participate in both cases or in neither. Hence, if AS is in this
range, placing the issue in all contingencies requires that prices are set so as to draw uninformed investors
into the market.
15We assume that agency problems in delegated portfolio management prevent unsophisticated in-
vestors from entrusting enough wealth to sophisticated ones as to overcome this limited wealth constraint.
16In principle, the issuer may rely on another type of auction so as to elicit pricing information
from sophisticated investors, such as a book-building method. However, even in this case sophisticated
investors would earn some informational rents at the issue stage in the transparent regime, whereas they
would not in the opaque one.
17If we were to reverse the order of moves, letting sophisticated investors play before liquidity traders,
there will be no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. To see this, suppose that sophisticated investors do
not acquire information: liquidity traders will then expect the ABS market to be perfectly liquid and will
want to participate to the market; but this will induce sophisticated investors to acquire information.
If instead sophisticated acquire information, the market will be illiquid, deterring liquidity traders'
participation, and thus eliminating the informed investors' incentive to acquire information.
18This assumption implies that, even in the absence of liquidity traders, market makers anticipate that
some informed investors may place orders with them, and therefore pins down their beliefs and thus the
prices that they will quote in this contingency. As we shall see below, these beliefs ensure the existence
of the equilibria in our game.
19Note that, even if market makers could become informed, they would have no incentive to do so:
market making activity requires them to post publicly observable quotes at all times. Hence, even if they
collected information about ; their quotes would reveal this information to other market participants,
and therefore they could not prot from it.
20With the same probability, sophisticated investors learn that  = H. But this piece of information
cannot be exploited by buying the ABS, since by assumption there are no liquidity buyers.
21If liquidity traders were to play the other equilibrium, the results that follow would be qualitatively
similar, except that the region of the parameter space with inactive ABS market would be larger.
22The crisis also triggered an increase in leverage (via a drop in fundamentals), which may also have
{ 63 {contributed to rendering both debt and equity more informationally sensitive and therefore less liquid,
as shown by Chang and Yu (2010).
{ 64 {